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Abstract: 
The chapter Code Monkey, a term usually used in the jargon of computer programmers, 
critically reflects the common presentation of the argumentation for the evolution of 
posthuman cyborgs, with regard to Darwin’s concept. The chapter Geek, again in 
terminological reference to software developers, overcomes the position of the code monkeys 
into a more intricate point of view with the help of Friedrich Nietzsche and his idea of 
overhuman, implicating indirectly the well-known Social brain hypothesis. The need of 
Secrets, the last Chapter, shows the necessity of deception and enigma and ends up in the 
question of boredom in a brave new world of Posthumanism. Because there is no organ for 
knowledge, only a will to knowledge, it follows from the impossibility of cryptological 
mastery of the mind that the posthuman cyborgs are not desirable according to Nietzsche, who 
advocates and deeply affirms these facts. 
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I. Code Monkey 
 
The enhancement and augmentation of human beings by means of engineering methods in the 
name of Charles Darwin is going to lead into an artificial improvement of our species directed 
toward the fusion of humans with nature. 
From the evolutionary regarded fusion of the organic with inorganic emerges a new kind of 
organism, the posthuman being or something like an overbeing. This so-called cyborg 
combines a living organism with a machine. Another technique could be to wire the human 
brain directly into computers like, for example, what the computer scientists Hans P. 
Moravec1 and Kevin Warwick2 are dreaming of.  
One may ask oneself if those presentations assumed the evolution of humankind, or the 
evolution of machines, or even more of natural laws. Although unspoken, one holds that this 
view of evolution takes the perspective of a human being. But, why? Is it a lack of the power 
of imagination? There is the deficiency in alternatives, because we have no other way of 
viewing things except from the human perspective; there is no other scale for speculation. 
Unfortunately, the imagination boggles at all the possibilities.  
The materialist standpoint, equalizing the organic and inorganic, as well as humans and 
machines, ignores the technical and philosophical interface-problems. Furthermore, they 
reject any difference by arguing that the distinction between ‘unnaturalness’ and ‘naturalness’ 
is only in the eye of the beholder (like taste or value). Therefore, it concludes that humans are 
as natural as technology. Moreover, technology is almost a part of humankind itself. What 
does this mean? “If we are, then how could the things we make be any less natural?”3  
                                                 
1 Moravec 1988 
2 Warwick 2000 
3 Ust 2001, 3 
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A similar position is this phrase commonly uttered: “New ideas and technologies are nearly 
impossible to stamp out.” Really? Linking ideas and technologies together by the general 
concept of ‘culture’, one wonders why so many of them did not succeed, even if they were 
proofed to be clearly better than their competitors. The power of dominant things is not 
universal, and furthermore the weak contradictory elements are surviving to be virulent. As 
stated in Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Natural Selection, the importance of 
coexistence of organisms in nature still remains, which is a lasting dynamic of evolution. 
Much more effective and powerful than traditional breeding or genetic engineering are self-
regulated human-machine systems, as they are seemingly both powerful enough and able to 
outwit and succeed within the process of Darwin’s process of selection. In all of this, the 
magic word is ‚self-regulating’. 
Such a cybernetic organism is called a cyborg. The term was first coined in 1960 when 
Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline used it in their article appearing in the journal 
Astronautics entitled “Cyborgs and Space”. They stated the following in their abstract: 
“Altering man’s bodily functions to meet the requirements of extraterrestrial environments 
would be more logical than providing an earthly environment for him in space.... Artifact-
organism systems which would extend man’s unconscious self-regulatory controls are one 
possibility (...).”4  
According to this view-point, intelligent self-regulation, as we call it today, is an unconscious 
process.  
Hence, two solutions exist and both of them are indicated in this well-known article: The 
adaption of a human being to nature, or the adaption of nature to a human being. There is a 
limit to both solutions as result of natural laws which cannot be changed. It is possible for 
humans to adapt to nature and natural circumstances through evolution by means of genetic 
changes, as well as making nature itself suitable for humans by inventing and exploiting new 
technologies. Yet, it must be pointed out clearly use of technology should not be exploited 
thoughtlessly without an understanding of nature and natural laws. 
From a humanistic point of view, the apparent pantheistic debate about “translation bodies in 
information” 5 tries with the help of a modern metaphor, the neuronal computer network, to 
overcome open question concerning enhancing our species. Information existing throughout 
eons of time turns out to be nothing, when taken alone in its dynamic evolution, or its 
possibility for potential combinations, because the key of cryptology for coding the 
information-combinations is missing. 
Friedrich Nietzsche reflects on this issue in an anthropological-philosophical manner: „What 
does man actually know about himself! (...) Does nature not conceal most things from him 
(...) in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive consciousness! She threw 
away the key: (...). Where in the world could the drive for truth have come from!“6 
In this words, Nietzsche hints at an intentional deception and disguise of existence itself by its 
playing a game of cryptological attack and defend, ending up with and culminating in a 
confusion of communication and the gaining of knowledge. For Nietzsche, the labyrinth is the 
symbol of this high insight. 
Referring to the article “Cyborgs and Space” by Clynes and Kline one may notice that 
Nietzsche takes into consideration not only the universe and all of existence, but also the 
argument of extending man’s boundaries and “unconscious self-regulatory controls” by 
putting unconsciousness at the very beginning of the origin of evolution, together with the 
ever inaccessible and the deceptive aspects of reality. And so concomitantly, the intelligence 
and the reason are untimely deceptive and inaccessible.  
                                                 
4 Clynes et al. 1960, 1 
5 Hayles 1999 
6 Nietzsche KSA 1 (1.), 877 
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With regard to the system-theoretical and evolutionary aspects in the article “Cyborgs and 
Space” its context is important, because it includes a whole perspective, that to say it opens 
our eyes to the universe. 
H. James Birx recognizes and emphasizes this important perspective: “Human evolution is an 
established fact supported by science and reason; our species is linked to life, earth history, 
this galaxy, and the universe itself. (...) Literally, everything that exists owes its birth and 
death to the stars.“ And continuing: “Science is an ongoing voyage of discovery toward new 
horizons within this changing cosmos: the universe is its laboratory. (...) However, there is no 
escape from nature (...).”7 
This statement and scenario is really true and describes our vivid living condition. Now, how 
one can deal with the limitations of human beings and move beyond them? Because, generally 
speaking, there is no compelling reason to accept things as they now are. In any case, every 
kind of moral appeal for challenging changes fades away unheard. Thinking otherwise is 
dogmatic for an evolutionist. 
Let us have a look at those thinkers who set up the first scientific and most well-known theory 
about cosmology. In 1755, one such thinker was the philosopher Immanuel Kant when he 
wrote his pioneering work Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Kant’s 
theory presented a dynamic view of the universe, speculating on the existence of life and 
intelligence elsewhere in the cosmos. This was before Darwin’s evolutionary framework. 
Following the philosopher Herbert Spencer and on the recommendation of Alfred R. Wallace, 
Darwin as an evolutionist dissociated himself from the misleading and intentionalitic term 
‘selection’, but instead used the phrase the “survival of the fittest” starting with the 5th edition 
of his On the Origin of Species (1869). The commonly known expression “struggle for 
existence” does not mean a real struggle in the literal sense, but instead: „I should premise 
that I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense, (...).”8 If Darwin’s 
evolution theory is valid, then: „in my theory there is no absolute tendency to progression, 
excepting from favorable circumstances!”9 
The circle of the philosophy of nature, which tries to make from the natural history a history 
of nature, is interrupted by Kant, who postulates: “Thus only the culture can be the last 
purpose, which one has to attach to nature in regard to humankind.“10 Kant points out 
emphatically that thereby natural purposes are not to be attributed by any means to the causes 
of natural laws. 
Now, let us leave the subtle argumentation of Kant without heightening it and switch over to 
the trans- and posthumanism visions again, which are putting human-nature and machine-
nature into one another, constituting them of the very same matter and assuming that they are 
obeying the same laws of physics. 
If nature is unconcerned about human beings, i.e.,, the selection does not necessarily have to 
progress – by the way, what does progress mean? – and if so, then one could design and 
realize the dream of such a complete emergence and transfer of a human to a computer, and it 
would be quite conceivable that this new kind of a machina sapiens changes gradually the 
moral concepts likewise, for reasons of a better adaption to the environment: for example, the 
values of silicon or steel, since they are without doubt more long-lived and much more able to 
survive than humans would ever be. In this case, the intellect of Homo sapiens would be 
useless and worthy to degenerate.  
The coming up of an evolution of such a culture of ‘nature’ or, more descriptivly and 
exemplarily, a culture of ‘silicon’ or of ‘stones’ would be still sufficient for the variety of 
                                                 
7 Birx 1988, 5-7 
8 Darwin 1859, Chap. III, 62 
9 Darwin Notebook N 47 
10 Kant 1902, Bd. 5, 431,30 sqq 
4 
 
species, since the new machina sapiens would be a most modest species, instead of one of the 
most ‘hungriest’, which occupies all niches and exploits the whole earth. 
Unexpectedly, one runs into a situation where one does not know who is master and who is 
man. While trying to integrate brain and intellect in a Cyborg-system, it seems as if one would 
like to gain reason, to control it as well as to give it away all at the same time, because this 
self-learning feedback-system is expected to know by itself (and unconsciously) very well 
what it is going to do further. 
Spoken from an evolutionary viewpoint, it is true what H. James Birx writes: “(...) the 
trilobites, ammonites, and dinosaurs clearly attest to both the creative and destructive forces 
of biological evolution. One may even speak of ‘living fossils’ (those forms of life that still 
cling to existence after an enormous period of time but are always in danger of vanishing). In 
fact, a single species usually never lasts more than a few million years.”11  
The main ideas of every The Transhumanist Declaration12 – which version does not matter – 
are overcoming age and the expanding and increasing of mental energy. Advantages among 
others are the increase of happiness and the reduction of existential risks. But, by the way, 
who really wants to live forever? Isn’t it quite a terrible thing to imagine? “And why?”  
Socrates would ask you. In order to feel and experience all the same again and again, just as 
in the eternal recurrence of the same as the philosopher Nietzsche would say.  
Is this still Darwin, to whom one refers? Darwin technologically enhanced? An active one-
sided development of one or only a few selected abilities, like a superhuman intelligence, is in 
accordance with a teleological, or just a theological way of thinking, and would not really 
correspond to an enlightened philosophy of nature without any purposes. Much too easily, it 
could happen that an ideological character appears, because such theories have individual and 
especially social implications. Darwin reminds us: „Man in his arrogance thinks himself a 
great work worthy the interposition of a deity.”13 And: „If all men were dead, then monkeys 
make men. – Men make angels – ”14 
A potential self-over-estimation of humans leads to a self-adulation, to an ‘old and abolished’ 
god in disguise. But, Nietzsche already told us about the abolishment of the idol-priest, the 





The examination of what the postmodern human might be, the human right after Darwin, is 
following the position, which is understanding the post like the postmodern tradition of Jean-
François Lyotard15, not as a temporal, historical succession, a one-after-another, but rather as 
a coexist next-to-each-other and a disorder. The post is analyzed in a context of complexity, 
which is quite dynamical. Everything flows.  
H. James Birx describes in ‘Nietzsche, Darwin & Time’16 the relevance of “a dynamic view of 
reality”. And: „A dynamical universe rich in temporal objects, passing events, and complex 
relationships.“17 Taking this scenario into account, the post can only indicated a sign of 
distance, which permits an all-around-perspective. The relevance of the dynamics, the 
universe and the culture shows up consequently in the postmodern smashing of the term 
subject as well as in the rejection of any kind of self-adulation. With regard to the superhuman 
                                                 
11 Birx 1988, 267 
12 See: http://humanityplus.org/learn/philosophy/transhumanist-declaration 
13 Darwin, Notebook C, 169-170 
14 Darwin, Notebook B, 169 
15 Lyotard 1986 
16 Talk given at the ‘Nietzsche-Forum München e.V’., München, 25.5.2009 (will be published) 
17 Birx 1988, 6 
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or to the Homo sapiens futurensis, as H. James Birx formulates more generally18, and the 
given evolutionary and perspectivist background, it is obviously that the following question 
arises: 
„I take the liberty of raising the question whether we have really become more moral. That all 
the world believes this to be the case merely constitutes an objection. We modern men, very 
tender, very easily hurt (...) really have the conceit that this tender humanity which we 
represent (...) represents positive progress; and that in this respect we are far above the men of 
the Renaissance. But that is how every age thinks, how it must think (...): our nerves would 
not endure that reality, not to speak of our muscles. (...) in itself, no morality has any value –: 
it would even arouse disdain. (...). Among men who still knew life differently: – fuller, more 
squandering, more overflowing – it would have been called by another name, (...). What was 
once the spice of life would be poison for us... (...) and we moderns, with our anxious self-
solicitude and neighbor-love, with our virtues of work, modesty, legality, and scientism – 
accumulating, economic, machinelike – appear as a weak age. Our virtues are conditional on, 
are provoked by, our weaknesses....“19 
Nietzsche states that morals is a farce. It is going hand in hand with evolution. The respective 
given physiological condition dictates the standards and values. Its analysis, which applies to 
our present time and its goals too, is frightening. Precarious are also the evolutionary 
consequences of this analysis: Because if it applies: „The strength to withstand tension, the 
width of the tensions between extremes, becomes ever smaller today; finally, - the extremes 
themselves become blurred to the point of similarity....“20 then with Nietzsche it would mean, 
that the reservoir of power for self-regeneration and self-increase becomes smaller and 
smaller and more improbable. Including technological aids, because under these conditions 
they would be wrongly used respectively; they would become necessarily, now more than 
ever, a sign and a measuring pole for the decline, the décadence. Hence, it follows for 
Nietzsche: “The neglected basic fact: Contradiction between the »becoming more moral« and 
the increase and strengthening of the type of human.”21 
How will the evolution of mind and intelligence develop in these circumstances? This 
question is important for the survival of humans and future posthumans, both embedded 
within a steadily changing environment. A call for the natural sciences and reason, as well as 
the recurrence to them, one may discover in all posthuman positions, as the transhumanist 
Nick Bostrom in his article “A History of Transhumanist Thought” declares: 
“Transhumanism has roots in rational humanism.”22 On the other hand, Nietzsche explains on 
his further considerations: „Indeed, we have not any organ at all for knowledge or for »truth«: 
we »know« (or »believe«, or »imagine«) just as much as may be of use in the interest of the 
human herd, the species; and even what is here called »usefulness« is ultimately only a belief, 
something fanciful and perhaps precisely the most fatal stupidity by which we shall one day 
perish.“23 Or also: „Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar 
(...). Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who attain 
knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security? How easily these men 
of knowledge are satisfied! (...). For »what is familiar is known«: on this they are agreed.“24 
Nevertheless, going on Nietzsche exhorts: „What is familiar is what we are used to; and what 
we are used to is most difficult to »know«.“ He achieves the knowledge, that: „There is more 
                                                 
18 Birx 1988, 268 
19 Nietzsche, KSA 6, (37.), 136pp. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Nietzsche, III 491 
22 Bostrom 2005, 3 
23 Nietzsche, KSA 3, (354.), 590 
24 Nietzsche, KSA 3, (355.), 593 
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sagacity in thy body than in thy best wisdom. (...). The creating body created for itself spirit, 
as a hand to its will.“25 
Darwin had searched for an explanation for the evolution of the brain and knowledge, too. In 
his notebooks from 1830, we already find sentences like these: „Intellect is a modification of 
intellect instinct – an unfolding & generalizing of the means by which an instinct is 
transmitted. – “26 Or: „The mind of man is no more perfect, than instincts of animals to all & 
changing contingencies, or bodies of either. – Our descent, then, is the origin of our evil 
passions!! – The Devil under form of Baboon is our grandfather! – “27  
Imprisoned in the cage of the body, it may seem logical for the posthumans to increase it 
artificial, and thus its instincts as well its mental and psychological dimension. But in relation 
to what, to which purpose should it be extended? Which point of reference is to be selected? 
And why? The conditions of the environment – but will they change in such a way (as fast) as 
the humans will change, i.e., as he will adapt intentionally to the (unknown) future scenario? 
One can move the focus away from the natural environment factors to augmented animal 
human living conditions. Nietzsche understands the struggle for life in a modifyed way: 
„As for the famous »struggle for existence«, so far it seems to me to be asserted rather than 
proved. It occurs, but as an exception; (...). Assuming, however, that there is such a struggle 
for existence (...) its result is unfortunately the opposite of what Darwin's school desires, and 
of what one might perhaps desire with them: namely, in favor of the strong, the privileged, the 
fortunate exceptions. The species do not grow in perfection: the weak prevail over the strong 
again and again, – for they are the great majority and they are also more intelligent... Darwin 
forgot the spirit (...) the weak have more spirit... One must need spirit to acquire spirit; – one 
loses it when one no longer needs it. Whoever has strength dispenses with the spirit (...). It 
will be noted that by »spirit« I mean care, patience, cunning, simulation, great self-control, 
and everything that is mimicry (...).“28 
To Nietzsche, is life as well as the struggle for life a result of the “wealth”, the “absurd 
prodigality” and the “luxury“.29 It has to be like this, because Nietzsche observes, that nature, 
in contrary to the human-made invented theories of economy or the cause-effect-principle, 
“does not manage well.”30 If it would be otherwise, than nature would economize “more 
reasonable”, so that its “custom of house would be: few costs and a hundred-multiple yield.”31 
The functionalism of nature, i.e., a general higher development of the evolution combined 
with an increase of intellect and morals of mankind, cannot be determined, – even though we 
would like very much to see it otherwise with heart. Rather, it is valid for this purpose: “They 
always affect only a few, but they should affect everybody.”32 
The human being is from the bottom of his nature a habitual liar, he must be, in order to adapt 
himself and to be able to survive. The humans are exercising this artistic skill into the 
sciences, arts and morals. Therefore: „For the evil is man's best force.“33  
The so-called evil is already revalued by Nietzsche and belongs to the highest values itself, 
because it is creative: „And he who hath to be a creator (...) he hath first to be a destroyer, and 
break values in pieces“34 Thus, it becomes obvious, that the human respectively the overman 
should have the following characteristics, which are worthy to expand: „He shall be the 
                                                 
25 Nietzsche, KSA 4, 40 
26 Darwin, Notebook N 48 
27 Darwin, Notebook M 123 
28 Nietzsche, KSA 6 (14.) 120 
29 Cf. ibid. 
30 Nietzsche KSA 1, (7), 405p. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Nietzsche, KSA 4, 359 
34 Nietzsche, KSA 4, 149 
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greatest who can be the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man 
beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, the superabundant of will; this shall be called 
greatness: (...).“35  
At this point, opposed to his own thoroughly convincing thought, the superhuman has 
betrayed something of his secret ideal.  
 
 
III. The need of secrets 
 
But why is there a secret at all? Why is such a secret necessary? Because not everyone does 
have a pronounced instinct for the ‘mimicry’ and the imitation in the aforementioned sense, 
but almost maintains mimicry to the contrary. It is questionable who of both is masked, or got 
rid of the mind. Nietzsche refers to the well-known ‘herd instinct’: „Why do men usually tell 
the truth in daily life? – Certainly not because a god has forbidden lying. Rather, because it is 
first is more convenient: for lies demand imagination, dissembling, and memory. (...) he must 
invent twenty other lies to make good the first. Then, (...) because the path of obligation and 
authority is safer than that of cunning (...). A child (...) will employ the lie naturally, and will 
always say instinctively that which corresponds to his interests.; (...), and so he lies in 
complete innocence.“36  
This kind of cunning and deception is not what Nietzsche has in mind for the posthumans, 
when he dreams of a superhuman, since the posthuman should expand, but not degenerate his 
abilities. However, the art of mimicry and imitation still holds further risks on the other hand, 
which the clever, great liar is faced with. One can lose the spirit, by having too much of it. 
During the (empathic) learning of the deception, of the ‘transferring and projecting oneself 
into another’ in order to manipulate him to his own purposes, one can lose one’s own ‘power 
to will’, one’s own egoistic interests, out of sight and mind, when one exaggerates, i.e., one 
looses the important “great self-control”.  
Then, the mental assumption of the other one, the allegedly weaker one happens: „If someone 
wants to seem to be something, stubbornly and for a long time, he eventually finds it hard to 
be anything else. The profession of almost every man, even the artist, begins with hypocrisy, 
as he imitates from the outside, copies what is effective.“37 This process becomes intensified 
significantly, when the artist-liar does not find a way out of his own play, but gets strongly 
involved, immersed, absorbed and thus looses the game: „In all great deceivers there occurs a 
noteworthy process to which they owe their power. In the actual act of deception, among all 
the preparations, (...) the belief in themselves overcomes them: (...). Self-deception must be 
present, so that both kinds of deceivers can have a grand effect. For men will believe 
something is true, if it is evident that others believe in it firmly.“38  
An incisive selection occurs, when steering toward the following dilemma: „The founders of 
religions are distinguished from those other great deceivers by the fact that they do not come 
out of this condition of self-deception: (...).“39 The tragedy of such an evolutionary selection 
is implied in its range. As shown by the example of the founders of religion, whom Nietzsche 
never gets tired to criticize, those actually strong and great ‘higher’ men finally do not bring 
forth an enhancement and enlightenment to the masses, to their species, but they establish 
during long lasting periods disadvantageous and ‘low’ herd-characteristics and prevent 
effectively a general higher development. Falling into oblivion and been wearisome, they 
sacrifice themselves, their ideas and their ‘will to power’ to the masses. 
                                                 
35 Nietzsche, KSA 5, (212.), 147 
36 Cf. Nietzsche, KSA 2, (54.), 73p. 
37 Nietzsche, KSA 2, (51.), 72p. 




Deception and self-deception are, from Nietzsche’s perspective point of view, quite natural, 
obviously characteristic of the abilities of human beings, and therefore nothing despicable; 
notwithstanding only a few, the great liars, are masters of the characteristic ‘pathos of 
distance’. The ‘pathos of distance’ determines the distance to oneself and between oneself 
and the others – and therefore the distance between deception and self-deception too. The will 
to power appears here, likewise the so-called superman. Nietzsche states as the quintessence: 
„Homo natura: the »will to power«.“40 
A balanced relation of defense and attack in the “struggle for life”, in the metaphorical “war 
of all against all” (Thomas Hobbes), which the philosophers Heraclitus and later on Nietzsche 
extend to the whole universe by the notion “war as father of all” implies, among other things, 
a sensible relation between aggression and altruism. 
Referring to Nietzsche’s thoughts again on the approach of science and knowledge, to the 
‘gay science’, as well as to nature and culture, then in general this is true: „That the world is 
not the abstract essence of an eternal reasonableness is sufficiently proved by the fact that that 
bit of the world which we know – I mean our human reason – is none too reasonable. And if 
this is not eternally and wholly wise and reasonable, the rest of the world will not be so either, 
(...).“41 
One should especially consider the important note and hint of H. James Birx: “If our species 
involves for countless eons, then the only major problem may be cosmic boredom.“42 
Following Nietzsche, this danger does not exist for Homo sapiens futurensis, which would 
imply to also the end of the evolution, because it is true: „(...), the intellect unfolds its 
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